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Commentary
Federalism and Judicial Review:
An Update
By JESSE H. CHOPER*
For nearly two decades, I have urged that the Supreme Court
should not decide constitutional questions respecting the power of the
national government vis-d-vis the states; rather, the issue of whether
federal action is beyond the authority of the national government and
thus violates states' rights should be treated as nonjusticiable, with the
final resolution relegated to the political branches.' When I began
seriously developing this Federalism Proposal in the early 1970s,2
nearly forty years had passed since an opinion of the Court had held
that national legislative or executive action violated the Tenth
Amendment's assurance of states' rights.3 Although the Court had by
no means adopted my Federalism Proposal in theory, it had done so in
practice-consistently upholding broad congressional exercises of reg-
ulatory power since the mid-1930s that affected both state and munici-
pal governments themselves, as well as private persons and businesses
located within the states.4
* Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall). D. Hu. Litt., Wilkes College; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; B.S. Wilkes
College.
1. First published as Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552 (1977) [hereinafter
Choper, The Scope of National Power], this proposal became a chapter in JSsE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRocEss: A FUNCTIONAL RE-
CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) [hereinafter CHOPER, JUDI-
cIAL REVIEW].
2. For an earlier suggestion, see Jesse H. Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial
Review, 17 CATH. U. L. REv. 20, 39-41 (1967).
3. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Justices ruled (5-4)-without an
opinion for the Court-that Congress had no power under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to lower the voting age to eighteen in state and local elections. This outcome
was overturned in less than a year with the ratification of the 26th Amendment.
4. See WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSITUTIONAL LAW: CAsEs-COMmENTs-
QUESTIONS 98-154 (7th ed. 1991).
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A dramatic change occurred, however, in 1976. In the celebrated
decision of National League of Cities v. Usery,5 the Court held that
Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
wages and hours of all state and municipal employees, including those
in police and fire departments, schools, and hospitals. Although af-
firming that federal minimum wage legislation is plainly permissible
under the Commerce Clause as applied to private businesses within
the states, the Court-overruling its 1968 decision in Maryland v.
Wirtz 6 -reasoned that it was unconstitutional if federal action (1) reg-
ulated the "States qua States" and (2) interfered with integral govern-
ment functions traditionally performed by state and local
governments.7 The Court defined "integral operations of state gov-
ernments" as those that were essential to the separate and independ-
ent existence of the states.8
During the next six years, the Court wrestled with this amorphous
constitutional standard, finding that a series of congressional enact-
ments did not abridge it.9 For instance, in 1981, the Court upheld a
federal statute that regulated the activities of coal mining companies,
even though the act of Congress displaced analogous state regulations
unless the states themselves imposed the federal standards. 10 The
Court reasoned that this was not "directed to States as States."" The
following year, the Court approved federal regulation of the labor-
management relations of a railroad owned by the state of New York,
opining that the operation of a railroad was not a function "tradition-
ally performed by state or local governments.' 2 A year later, the
Court held that a federal statute forbidding age discrimination could
be applied to bar Wyoming's mandatory-retirement-at-age-55 rule for
fish and game wardens, concluding that this did not "directly impair
the State's ability to structure integral operations."'" In the instance
probably most intrusive to the states of all, the Court upheld a federal
5. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
6. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
7. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851-55.
8. Id. at 851-52. For the view that this result "runs counter to the accepted and his-
torically accurate reading of the tenth amendment," and is "supported neither by the fram-
ers' intent nor by any constitutional language," see Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv.
84, 100, 103 (1985).
9. See Field, supra note 8, at 91-95.
10. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 305 (1981).
11. Id. at 265.
12. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982).
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1983)
(internal quotation omitted).
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law that required state agencies regulating power companies to (1)
adjudicate disputes concerning federal policies, (2) consider adopting
substantive federal policies and to give reasons for their decisions with
respect to this, and (3) afford certain procedural rights with respect to
all of these activities.14 Finally, in 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority,"5 the Court-recognizing that the Na-
tional League of Cities standard was "unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice""6 -overruled its earlier decision. Reasoning
that "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system
than by judicially created limitations on federal power, ' 17 a majority
of the Justices relied on the seemingly radical theory of my Federalism
Proposal. 8
The reach of the Court's doctrine, however, was specifically con-
fined to national regulation of the "States as States;"'19 it clearly did
not apply-as did the Federalism Proposal-to federal regulation of
private persons or activities within the states.20 Moreover, the Court
hesitated to follow the logic of the Federalism Proposal to its ultimate
conclusion, even in respect to national regulation of the states as
states. Rather than unconditionally delegating final resolution of the
constitutional issue to the national political branches, the Court im-
plied that it would consider "the possibility that some extraordinary
defects in the national political process might render congressional
regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment."'"
Despite these restrictions, the Garcia ruling evoked a heated dissent
from four members of the Court, with then-Justice Rehnquist plainly
implying that the decision would be overruled just as soon as the Na-
14. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
15. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
16. Id. at 546.
17. Id. at 552.
18. Id. at 551 n.11, 554 n.18.
19. Id. at 537.
20. Paradoxically, Garcia's greater deference to the federal legislative process in re-
spect to congressional regulation of state government operations (in contrast to the activi-
ties of private persons and businesses within the state) was directly opposed to National
League of Cities' enhanced judicial protection for the "integral operations of state
governments."
21. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988). For discussion of this opening
for judicial intervention, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Juris-
prudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Or. REv. 341.
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tional League of Cities principle "again command[ed] the support of a
majority of this Court."'2 2
Garcia represented the Federalism Proposal's high-water mark.
Even during the period that its five-Justice majority remained on the
bench, the Court declined to avail itself of several opportunities to
extend its rationale beyond exercises of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause. Thus, in South Dakota v. Dole, ' 3 where Congress
had withheld 5% of federal highway funds from any state that did not
raise its minimum drinking age to 21, rather than apply the Garcia
principle to the federal spending power and hold that "the fundamen-
tal limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes... to protect the
'States as States' is one of process rather than one of result, 2 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, assigning the opinion to himself, upheld the condi-
tioned expenditure on the merits. Although conceding that Congress
could act "indirectly under its spending power to encourage''25 state
action that it could not compel under its regulatory powers, the
Court's ruling explicitly affirmed the existence of a judicially enforcea-
ble substantive restriction on federal expenditures: "[I]n some circum-
stances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compul-
sion.""' 6 Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens-all adher-
ents to Garcia-joined the Chief Justice's opinion with neither
comment nor protest, despite the fact that Dole's promise of substan-
tive judicial review in favor of states' fights for exercises of the spend-
ing power, which Garcia had withheld for exertions of the commerce
power, was glaringly inconsistent with the National League of Cities
caveat that the Tenth Amendment strictures on the commerce power
that it had created were inapplicable to the spending power.27 Most
surprisingly, Justice Brennan-the fifth Garcia supporter-dissented
in Dole, urging a judicial finding that "regulation of the minimum age
22. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and O'Connor. See also Justice O'Connor's
"belief that [the] Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id. at
528 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
24. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
25. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 211.
27. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. See also Albert J. Rosenthal, Con-
ditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. Rev. 1103, 1140 (1987).
Although it has been suggested that the protections for state interests in the national polit-
ical process may be less effective in countering burdensome conditions on spending than in
preventing intrusive direct regulations, id. at 1141, I know of no supporting evidence for
this thesis, either empirical or anecdotal.
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of purchasers of liquor falls squarely within the ambit of those powers
reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment."28 This line of
reasoning, of course, flatly contradicts the core of the Court's position
in Garcia that "the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which
special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally
in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in...
[judicially enforceable] limitations on the objects of federal
authority. 29
A year later, the Court, following a slightly different path,
reached the same conclusion as Dole with respect to the taxing power.
In South Carolina v. Baker,3" the Court upheld a provision of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 which denied federal in-
come tax exemption for interest earned on unregistered (or bearer)
state bonds. First, the Court ruled that, even though Congress had
acted here through use of the tax laws, the provision effectively com-
pelled states to issue only registered bonds.3 Still, this regulation was
held to be constitutional under the Garcia analysis.32 More significant
for purposes of this discussion, the Court then responded to South
Carolina's contention that congressional exercise of the taxing power
in this instance violated the intergovernmental immunity of the
states.3 The five Justices who unqualifiedly joined the opinion of the
Court in Baker, written by Justice Brennan, were the same five Jus-
tices who comprised the majority in Garcia.34 Nonetheless, rather
than relying on the Federalism Proposal and invoking "[tihe effective-
ness of the federal political process in preserving the States' inter-
ests"'35 as they had in Garcia, these five Justices rejected South
Carolina's claim of a limited congressional taxing power on the merits.
Whatever the reasons for the Garcia majority's hesitancy to apply
that decision beyond the relatively narrow confines of the Commerce
28. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
30. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
31. Id. at 511.
32. Id. at 512-15. In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia took the occasion to disso-
ciate himself from "the proposition attributed to ... [Garcia] in today's opinion .... that
the 'national political process' is the States' only constitutional protection, and that nothing
except the demonstration of 'some extraordinary defects' in the operation of that process
can justify judicial relief." 485 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Scalia left
little doubt as to his identifying with his indirect predecessor, Chief Justice Burger, in the
camp of the Garcia dissenters. Justice Kennedy, who had succeeded Justice Powell, an-
other Garcia dissenter, did not participate in the Baker decision.
33. Id. at 515-27.
34. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
35. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
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Clause, the continued vitality of the fundamental premise for the Gar-
cia rationale became seriously endangered on Justice Brennan's re-
tirement in 1990. Within the year, the Court held in Gregory v.
Ashcroft36 that the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
did not apply to state judges, and therefore did not preempt a provi-
sion of the Missouri Constitution mandating retirement at age 70. The
new majority, speaking through Justice O'Connor, invoked a principle
of statutory interpretation that had been articulated in cases challeng-
ing congressional action as violative of the Eleventh Amendment as
well as other instances of alleged federal intrusion into "the historic
powers of the States: '37 "[I]f Congress intends to alter the 'usual con-
stitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,'
it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute."' 38 Although the four remaining Justices who had com-
prised the prevailing five in Garcia all dissented in Gregory, the
Court's "plain statement" rule furthered the Federalism Proposal's
theme that the national judiciary should continue to play a substantial
role in articulating the constitutional values of American federalism,
by, for instance,, following "its customary procedure of assuming, in
the absence of clear contrary evidence, that Congress (or the execu-
tive) either did not intend or did not consider applications of its enact-
ments that appear to test the limits of national power. ' 39 Moreover,
contrary to the Gregory dissenters' criticism, the fact that the Court
primarily relied on cases concerning the Eleventh Amendment,
rather than the Tenth Amendment does not affect the analysis be-
cause both constitutional provisions similarly involve the scope of na-
tional power versus states' rights.4' Nonetheless, the overall tenor of
the Gregory opinion, which carried much of the flavor of the Garcia
dissent, may have justified the Gregory dissenters' complaint that the
Court's approach was "contrary to... our Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence" and "contravene[d] our decisions in Garcia."'42
Although Gregory clearly reflected a change in the attitude of the
new majority (which now included Justice Souter in place of Justice
Brennan), the Court made no significant doctrinal modifications of
36. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
37. Id. at 2401.
38. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
39. CHOPER, JUDICIAL Rlvmw supra note 1, at 240.
40. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
41. CHOPER, JIticIAL REvmw, supra note 1, at 395-97.
42. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2408, 2410.
the Garcia principle. That came about one year later. In New York v.
United States,43 the Court, again speaking through Justice O'Connor,
held that a part of the Federal Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985-which stipulated that any state failing to
provide for the disposal of the waste generated within its borders by
1996 would be deemed to take title to and be responsible for it-un-
constitutionally invaded the "'residual and inviolable sovereignty' ...
reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment."'  The six-
Justice majority for this judgment-only the second since 1936 to in-
validate national action under the Tenth Amendmenta-was made up
of those who had prevailed in Gregory (the four Garcia dissenters and
Justice Souter) joined by Justice Thomas, who had replaced Justice
Marshall at the beginning of the Term. The three remaining members
of the Garcia Court dissented.
The essence of the New York Court's rationale was as follows:
"Congress has substantial powers to govern the nation directly," and
may "encourage a State to regulate in a particular way."46 For exam-
ple, Congress may place conditions on the receipt of federal funds
pursuant to the spending power, or require that the states either regu-
late according to federal standards or have state rules preempted by
federal law under the commerce power.47 However, "Congress may
not simply 'commandeer' the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram."'48 The Court then asserted that, because "the Constitution
would not permit Congress either simply to transfer radioactive waste
from generators to state governments, ' 49 or to "requir[e] .. . the
43. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
44. Id. at 2435.
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 2421, 2423.
47. Id. at 2423-24.
48. Id. at 2420. As to the contention that this policy derives from a "'lively debate
among the Framers' on 'the question whether the Constitution should permit Congress to
employ state governments as regulatory agencies,"' it "seems almost directly contradictory
to views expressed by Madison and Hamilton. On at least four occasions, The Federalist
appears to assert that the proposed federal government would have the authority to use
state officers to carry out federal activities." H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. RPv. 633, 661 (1993).
49. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428. The sole reason offered by the Court to support this
pronouncement was that "such a forced transfer, standing alone, would in principle be no
different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive
waste producers." Id. But it may be similarly contended that application of the minimum
wage requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local governments, upheld
in Garcia, "would in principle be no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy
from state governments to" their employees.
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States to become liable for the generators' damages," the statute's al-
ternative afforded no constitutionally permissible "choice" at all.
Rather, it instructed state governments to "regulat[e] ... pursuant to
Congress' direction."5 The Court found no need to "revisit" Garcia
because, like National League of Cities and Wirtz, that decision "con-
cerned the authority of Congress to subject state governments to gen-
erally applicable laws," whereas New York was "not a case in which
Congress ha[d] subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to
private parties."' 51 But, as Justice White pointed out in dissent, "[i]n
no case has the Court rested its holding on such a distinction" and "an
incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally ac-
ceptable if the federal statute that 'commands' specific action also ap-
plies to private parties."52 Indeed, the idea of a restriction on
Congress' ability to regulate the "States qua States" was at the core of
the National League of Cities approach rejected in Garcia.
The primary justification advanced by the Court for its edict
against congressional mandates of state regulations was that "the ac-
countability of both state and federal officials is diminished" thereby:
"Where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."'53 There
is good reason to doubt this hypothesis, particularly because "[i]n an
age of high-powered special interest groups and mass communication,
a truly disgruntled local electorate should not have problems in deter-
mining which governmental body is actually responsible."5 " But even
if it were true, the Court's opinion offers no reason as to why this
50. Id. at 2413.
51. Id. at 2419-20.
52. Id. at 2441 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is neither evidence nor reason
to believe that the security of states' rights or the values of federalism will carry any greater
or lesser force in the dynamics of the national political process, see infra note 60, depend-
ing on whether the congressional action is generally applicable rather than only targeting
the states. See infra text accompanying notes 60-66; see also CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW,
supra note 1, at 176-90.
53. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2441.
54. Wayne 0. Hanewicz, Note, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a Return
to the Battle Scene, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1605, 1625. A recent full page political advertise-
ment on the subject of waste disposal sponsored by twenty major California organiza-
tions-including the Chamber of Commerce, the principal power companies, and labor
union councils-contained no ambiguity as to which level of government was blamewor-
thy: "For 30 years, California's waste was shipped to safe disposal facilities in Washington
and Nevada.. . . The same federal law that allowed these two states to close their borders
to California made each state responsible for taking care of its own waste." S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 24, 1994, at A13.
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particular value of federalism, as compared to the many other benefits
that flow from our system of territorial division of power, should be
secured by judicial review rather than by "[t]he effectiveness of the
federal political process""5 as decided in Garcia.
It is true, as Professor Hoke points out, that New York's approach
may be distinguished from the National League of Cities regime that
was discredited in Garcia: New York provides a "legal standard" 6-
Congress may not commandeer the legislative processes of the States
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program-that is "judicially discoverable and ... manageable'57 in
that it would "seem to permit reasoned, consistent application."5" At
the same time, however, Professor Hoke demonstrates the analytic
and normative weakness of this newly announced legal standard: de-
spite New York, "[a] multitude of methods remain available to the
Federal government, either by direct regulation [preempting state law]
or by indirect coaxing, to generate State participation in intergovern-
mental regulatory partnerships."5 9 Indeed, it may be fairly asked
whether the values of federalism are not better served when the na-
tional government enlists state cooperative efforts in resolving locally
sensitive issues, in contrast to Congress' handling the matter through
agents sent directly from Washington.
The difficulty in articulating a judicially enforceable principle for
constitutional issues of federalism was one of the major justifications
for the development of the Federalism Proposal,60 as well as for the
Court's adoption of the Garcia doctrine.6' But the primary force that
drove the Federalism Proposal (and that led to the Court's pro-
nouncement in Garcia) was not just that "federalism issues involve
considerations of practicality rather than principle," 62 but that "state
interests are forcefully represented in the national political process-
55. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
56. Candice Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 495 (1994).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 574.
59. Id. at 496.
60. Because of the "highly pragmatic nature of federal-state questions," in that the
"fundamental issue turns in large measure on the relative competence of different levels of
government to deal with societal problems;" "the Court is no more inherently capable of
correct judgment than its companion federal branches. Indeed, the judiciary may well be
less capable" as to these matters in contrast to questions of individual rights which involve
"government according to principle." CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw, supra note 1, at 201-02.
61. The Court was troubled by "the elusiveness of objective criteria for 'fundamental'
elements of state sovereignty." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.
62. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvmw, supra note 1, at 2.
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which is peculiarly capable of fairly reconciling the competing inter-
ests .... When democratic processes may be generally trusted to
produce a fair constitutional judgment, it advances the democratic tra-
dition to vest that judgment with popularly responsible institutions."'63
The major development of my argument for the Federalism Proposal
involved an effort to demonstrate this thesis both logically and empiri-
cally. Similarly, in Garcia, after first explaining that "the principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government it-
self,"" the Court documented its conclusion that "[t]he effectiveness
of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is
apparent even today in the course of federal legislation" 65 by noting
that "at the same time that the States have exercised their influence to
obtain.., a substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own
treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in aid,
-.. they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of
obligations imposed by Congress. 66
Since Garcia, the record of the states' ability to secure their vital
interests against federal encroachments without the aid of judicial re-
view has been consistent with their earlier successes. Perhaps the
most dramatic confirmation came within eight months after Garcia
when Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to substan-
tially reduce its financial impact on state and local governments.67
63. Id. at 2, 203. In addition to the factors of (1) complexity in fashioning a standard
for judicial review, (2) strong representation of state interests in the national political
branches, and (3) ameliorating the conflict between judicial review and majoritarian de-
mocracy, I also observed that "the Court, in employing the power of judicial review and
thus thwarting popular will by rejecting judgments of electorally responsible political insti-
tutions, expends its limited capital and diminishes its ability to gain compliance with the
decisions it renders." Id. I pointed out that "[j]udicial validation of federal power as
against states' rights has often placed the Court at the center of a storm of controversy...
[as] have the Court's rulings invalidating such national action." Choper, The Scope of the
National Power, supra note 1, at 1579. Thus, I urged that the Court's adoption of the
Federalism Proposal would permit it both to avoid "needless adjudication of a troublesome
category of constitutional issues ... [and to strengthen] judicial review's central function of
curbing majoritarian abuse of the constitutional liberties of the individual." Id. Although I
stand by the importance of this consideration, if I were permitted only one clarifying state-
ment in respect to the entire book, it would be to emphasize that this factor was supple-
mentary to the others-a significant but nonetheless derivative benefit of my effort "to
advance a principled, functional, and desirable role for judicial review in our democratic
political system." CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw, supra note 1, at 2.
64. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
65. Id. at 552.
66. Id. at 552-53.
67. For a case study, see Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Con-
gressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 UPn.
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The point, of course, is not that Congress never overcomes state-
voiced protests to proposed national actions that burden local inter-
ests.68 According to a recent study of the processes and outcomes of
several congressional endeavors in this area, "the 'political safeguards
of federalism' do not operate automatically to protect important state
interests .... To assure that the values of federalism will be consid-
ered in Congress, state and local governments must make active ef-
forts to protect their own interests. ' 69 But, the study reports, when
they do, they often succeed.70
Ironically, the radioactive waste disposal legislation at issue in
New York provides a powerful example of Congress' responding to
state wishes when attacking a serious national problem. As Justice
White's dissent recounts in detail, the federal provisions "resulted
from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of reme-
dies to the waste problem" through "congressional sanction of inter-
state compromises they had reached. '71 As Professor Hoke confirms,
the effort was to "guarantee that all State governments assumed re-
sponsibility for disposal of the [low-level radioactive waste] generated
within their borders,"'72 and not simply to have the states of Washing-
ton, Nevada, and South Carolina be the dumping grounds for the en-
tire nation. A task force of the National Governors' Association had
"urged that 'each state should accept primary responsibility for the
safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its bor-
ders' and that 'the states should pursue a regional approach to the
low-level waste disposal problem."'7" The state of New York had
"participated and supported passage of this [unanimously approved
congressional] legislation at both the gubernatorial and federal repre-
sentative levels, and then enacted state laws specifically to comply
with the deadlines and timetables agreed upon by the States in the
1985 Act."74 Although the "take-title" provision held invalid by the
LAW 301 (1988). For another example of this type of congressional response, see Hospital
Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc, v. Toia, 435 F. Supp. 819, 823, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that
after governors and state attorneys general complained, and New York was ordered to pay
a judgment of forty million dollars, Congress repealed the requirement that states waive
their Eleventh Amendment immunity as a condition for receiving Medicaid grants).
68. For illustrations of congressional rejections of state objections, see Lee, supra note
67, at 325, 333.
69. Id. at 333-35.
70. Id.
71. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2435 (White, J., dissenting).
72. Hoke, supra note 56, at 530.
73. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2436 (White, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2444.
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Court had not been itself considered or recommended by state offi-
cials,75 the Governors' Task Force had plainly approved of congres-
sional "sanctions to compel the establishment of new disposal sites"
76
within as few as two years after the 1985 amendments were passed.
"If the structural theory ever should insulate congressional action
from judicial review, surely New York was that case. The states had
participated fully in the political process, and they had won the polit-
ical battle."'77 That some states suffered distinctive burdens because
of the shared responsibilities imposed upon them by the state-
prompted federal legislation78 is by no means unusual. A great many
indisputably valid national regulations have a highly uneven impact on
various states and regions of the country.79
Professor Hoke's article carefully reviews various models for na-
tional health regulation in light of possible constitutionally-based fed-
eralism defects that she sensitively and persuasively derives from the
Court's analysis in New York, occasionally offering creative (although
not illogical) extensions of the opinion's rationale.80 In my view, how-
ever, a number of the constitutional problems that she discerns
sharply illustrate additional shortcomings8' of the renewed effort in
New York to afford judicial protection for states' rights. Two exam-
ples stand out.
First, Professor Hoke examines the technique of imposing a fed-
eral tax "on private citizens and entities in any State that refuses to
institute the Federal regulatory program." If this tax assesses a charge
"that... far exceed[s] the costs of instituting the Federal program...
States will again be faced with an ephemeral choice: either institute a
regulatory program that meets Federal standards or take the political
responsibility for substantially increased taxes on their citizenry. '
Although I have no quarrel with Professor Hoke's assessment of the
reality, this move would appear plainly to be within Congress' spend-
ing power under longstanding principles. Indeed, it mirrors the provi-
sion of the Social Security Act of 1935 relating to unemployment
compensation that was upheld by the Court in the landmark decision
75. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REv. 163, 177 n.37
(1992).
76. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2436 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Deborah J. Merritt, Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role
for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
78. Hoke, supra note 56, at 559-60.
79. See CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 1, at 190-93.
80. See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 56, at 550-573.
81. See supra note 49.
82. Hoke, supra note 56, at 565-66.
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of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis:83 A federal tax, payable into the
general funds of the Treasury, was imposed on all employers of eight
or more persons. If the taxpayer contributed to a state-created unem-
ployment fund that was certified as meeting certain minimum federal
standards, the taxpayer was entitled to credit such contributions up to
an amount of ninety percent of the federal tax. But if the employer's
state chose not to institute q system of unemployment compensation,
no benefits flowed to anyone in the state.84 Faced with a "Hobson's
choice" similar to that described by Professor Hoke, all the states
quickly fell into line.85
Second, Professor Hoke reviews the model whereby "the Federal
government commands States to engage in a particular regulatory ac-
tivity .... If the State fails to do so ... the Federal government
implements the program within the noncomplying State and charges
the State a 'fee' or tax for the regulatory program."8 6 She concludes,
"New York clearly undermines the constitutionality of this strategy,
for the scheme again presents States with ephemeral 'choices."'" Be-
cause "the provisions do not impose any structural incentive upon the
Federal government to keep the costs of programs reasonable,"8" the
states must "either accept the open-ended liability of paying the Fed-
eral government's expenses in establishing and maintaining the pro-
gram or 'regulate according to the instructions of Congress."' 8 9 As a
practical matter, however, the state's choice here is realistically no
more restricted nor its liability more open-ended than when it is told,
as in Dole, that the spending power authorizes Congress to withhold
federal highway funds if the state does not raise its drinking age;90 or,
as in Baker, that the taxing power enables Congress to deny federal
income tax benefits for any state bonds that are unregistered; 91 or, as
in Garcia, that the commerce power permits Congress to require the
states to pay all its employees the minimum hourly wage as well as
overtime rates if they work more than forty hours per week.92 Indeed,
rather than formally imposing a "tax" or "fee" on the states under
either the taxing or regulatory powers, Congress might instead
83. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
84. Id. at 574-76.
85. Id. at 587.
86. Hoke, supra note 56, at 558.
87. Id. at 561.
88. Id. at 560.
89. Id. at 561 (quoting New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2428).
90. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.
91. Baker, 485 U.S. at 511-15.
92. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554-56.
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achieve the identical result by invoking its even broader conditioned
spending power and simply reducing certain federal subsidies to the
state by the amount that it costs the federal government to administer
its health program within the noncomplying state.
A majority of the Justices now on the Supreme Court are plainly
unsympathetic to the Garcia approach.93 Thus, it appears that the
Court will be inclined to invalidate national executive or legislative
actions that it feels "go too far" in curtailing state sovereignty, either
by chipping away at Garcia, as it did in New York, or by directly over-
ruling that decision as originally promised by then-Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. Professor Hoke evidently finds this to be a "salutary result, '94
believing that "the very survival of State governments as independent
sources of law and policy is seriously threatened if the Tenth Amend-
ment is not justiciable." 95
In my view, however, this apocalyptic judgment is neither sup-
ported by the actual data nor avoided by the Courts' reinstatement of
National League of Cities. First, I do not believe that the Federalism
Proposal is the product of "a legal and political culture that finds fed-
eralism outmoded and its underlying values... unpersuasive."96 The
fact is that state and local governments have flourished and expanded
greatly97 during the sixty years that the Court has operated on "the
proposition that the political process alone sufficiently protects feder-
alism and its underlying values."98 It would be a serious mistake to
equate the enormous growth of the national government during this
period with a diminution of state and local power. Moreover, while
disillusionment with the efficacy of the national government has in-
creased dramatically in the opinion of the general public, as well as
many of its elected representatives in the political branches, perhaps
because, as Professor Hoke herself recognizes, "the American people
realize that their ability to assure a government responsive to their
values and desires will be difficult to achieve if most or virtually all
93. The only identified remaining adherents are Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Jus-
tice Ginsburg-who has now replaced Justice White, one of Garcia's most enthusiastic
backers-has clearly perceived Garcia's implications, see Brock v. Washington Metro.
Area Trans. Auth., 796 F.2d 481, 484 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986), but has yet to indicate her view
of the matter.
94. Hoke, supra note 56, at 574.
95. Id. at 575.
96. Id.
97. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw, supra note 1, at 188-90.
98. Id.
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power to decide policy resides in one national capital." 99 Second,
even the most avid proponents of the Court's return to a more activist
posture in regard to states' rights usually acknowledge, as Professor
Hoke has written,"° that judicial enforcement of the Tenth Amend-
ment serves the cause of federalism largely as a matter of form rather
than substance. 10 1
99. Hoke, supra note 56, at 547 (emphasis added).
100. See supra text accompanying note 59.
101. For consideration of how judicial review may actually work to the detriment of
state sovereignty, see CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw, supra note 1, at 226-28.
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